In a recent breakthrough paper Braverman et al. (in: STOC'13, pp 151-160, 2013) developed a local characterization for the zero-error information complexity in the two-party model, and used it to compute the exact internal and external information complexity of the 2-bit AND function. In this article, we extend their results on AND function to the multi-party number-in-hand model by proving that the generalization of their protocol has optimal internal and external information cost for certain natural distributions. Our proof has new components, and in particular, it fixes a minor gap in the proof of Braverman et al.
required for players who wish to evaluate a function that depends on their private inputs. Information complexity, on the other hand, is concerned with the amount of information that the communicated bits reveal about the inputs of the players to each other, or to an external observer.
One of the important achievements of information complexity is the recent breakthrough of [2] that determines the exact asymptotics of the randomized communication complexity of one of the oldest and most studied problems in communication complexity, set disjointness:
Here R ε (·) denotes the randomized communication complexity with an error of at most ε on every input, and DISJ n denotes the two-party set disjointness problem in which two players, each holds a subset of [n], need to verify if their subsets are disjoint. Prior to the discovery of these information-theoretic techniques, proving the lower bound R ε (DISJ n ) = Ω(n) had already been a challenging problem, and even Razborov's [14] short proof of that fact is intricate and sophisticated. Let AND k : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} be the k-party AND function where the input has k bits. We usually denote AND 2 simply by AND. Note that the DISJ n is nothing but an OR of AND functions. More precisely, for i = 1, . . . , n, if x i is the Boolean variable which represents whether i belongs to Alice's set or not, and y i is the corresponding variable for Bob, then n i=1 (x i ∧ y i ) is true if and only if Alice's input intersects Bob's input. Braverman et al. [2] exploited this fact to prove (1) .
Roughly speaking, they first determined the exact information complexity of the AND function for any underlying distribution μ on the set of inputs {0, 1}×{0, 1}, and then used the fact that amortized communication equals information complexity [4] to relate this to the communication complexity of DISJ n . The constant 0.4827 in (1) is indeed the maximum of the information complexity of the 2-bit AND function over all distributions μ that assign a zero mass to (1, 1) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}. That is 
where IC μ (AND) denotes the information complexity of the 2-bit AND function with respect to the distribution μ with no error (see Definition 3 below). A similar phenomenon also happens in the multi-party setting. Consider the k-party promised set disjointness problem PDISJ n,k : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n ×· · ·×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} in the number-in-hand model, where k players each holds a subset of [n] , and it is promised that either these k subsets are all pairwise disjoint, or they intersect at exactly one element of [n] . Similarly, the k-party set disjointness function can also be expressed as an OR of AND k functions. Let e i ∈ {0, 1} k be the usual i th basis vector (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), and 0, 1 denote the all-0 and all-1 vectors, respectively. For the promised set disjointness function PDISJ n,k , the fact that those subsets either are pairwise disjoint or intersect at exactly one element shows the input to AND k must lie in the subset {0, 1, e 1 , . . . , e k }. Using this fact, [5, 9] determined R ε (PDISJ n,k ) = Ω(n/k) by showing a lower bound of (a variant of) the information complexity of
Our Contributions
Fixing the argument of [2] In order to show that the buzzers protocol has optimal information cost, inspired by the work of Ma and Ishwar [11, 12] , Braverman et al. came up with a local concavity condition, and showed that if a protocol satisfies this condition, then it has optimal information cost. This condition, roughly speaking, says that it suffices to verify that one does not gain any advantage over the conjectured optimal protocol if one of the players starts by sending a bit B. In the original paper [2] , it is claimed that it suffices to verify this condition only for signals B that reveal arbitrarily small information about the inputs. As we shall see, however, this is not true, see Sect. 3.1.
In Theorem 2 we prove a variant of the local concavity condition that allows one to consider only signals B with small information leakage, this fixes the argument in [2] . We have been informed through private communication that Braverman et al. have also independently fixed this error.
Another minor issue in [2] is that one notation is used for two different notions of information complexity, this sometimes causes confusion. In order to emphasize difference between the two different notions of information complexity, we define both notions and apply different notations. We discuss this in Sect. 2.2. [2] to the multi-party setting We then apply Theorem 2 to extend the information complexity result of [2] on two-party AND 2 function, to the multi-party AND k function in the number-in-hand model. To achieve this, we proceed by defining a generalization of the buzzers protocol, and then prove in Theorem 3 that it has optimal internal and external information cost when the input distribution μ for AND k satisfies the following assumption:
Extension of

Assumption 1
The support of μ is a subset of {0, 1, e 1 , . . . , e k }.
Note that in the two-party setting, every distribution satisfies this assumption and thus our results are complete generalizations of the results of [2] of the two-party setting. As we discussed before, the distributions in Assumption 1 arise naturally in the study of the multi-party promised set disjointness problem, and they have been considered previously in [5, 9] .
This extension is not straightforward since in [2] , a large part of the calculations for verifying the local concavity conditions are carried out by the software Mathematica, however, in the number-in-hand model, the number of players k can be arbitrary, one cannot simply rely on a computer for those calculations. Indeed, we had to look into the protocol and show that it suffices to analyze the behaviour of the information cost in a small time interval that is determined by the distribution of the inputs, and furthermore one can reduce all distributions into a class of essentially 3-parameter distributions. Hence the problem can be reduced to one that has only a constant number of variables, thus allowing us to use Mathematica to verify the concavity condition. We believe our analysis may provide new insights even for the two-party setting.
Preliminaries
Notation
We typically denote random variables by capital letters (e.g., A, B, C, X , Y , Π), and write A 1 . . . A n to denote the random variable (A 1 , . . . , A n ). We simply use the word distribution to mean a probability distribution. Let [k] := {1, . . . , k}. Given a finite space Ω, the notation Δ(Ω) denotes the set of all probabilistic distributions on Ω.
Let X , Y be two random variables distributed on a finite space Ω. 
Let supp(μ) denote the support of a distribution μ. Let μ, ν be two distributions on a finite space Ω. Define |μ − ν| := ν(a) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence (a.k.a. relative entropy) from ν to μ. We also use D(X ||Y ) to denote the divergence from the distribution of a random variable Y to the distribution of a random variable X . Given three random variables X , Y , Z , one has I(XY ; Z ) = E z∼Z D(XY | Z =z ||XY ), and I(X ; Y |Z ) = E y∼Y ,z∼Z D(X | Y =y,Z =z ||X | Z =z ). For more details on entropy, mutual information and divergence, see [6] .
A random binary bit is sometimes also called a signal.
Communication Complexity and Information Complexity
We briefly review the notion of two-party communication complexity which was introduced by Yao [15] , a standard reference on communication complexity is [10] . In this model there are two players (with unlimited computational power), often called Alice and Bob, who wish to collaboratively compute a given function f : X ×Y → Z. Alice receives an input x ∈ X and Bob receives y ∈ Y. Neither of them know the other player's input, and they wish to communicate in accordance with an agreed-upon protocol π to compute f (x, y). The protocol π specifies as a function of (only) the transmitted bits whether the communication is over, and if not, who sends the next bit.
Furthermore π specifies what the next bit must be as a function of the transmitted bits and the input of the player who sends the bit. The transcript Π of a protocol π is the list of all the transmitted bits during the execution of the protocol. In the randomized communication model, the players have access to private random strings. These random strings are independent, and they can have any desired distributions individually. The communication cost of a protocol π is the maximal number of transmitted bits among all possible inputs (x, y) ∈ X × Y. The communication complexity of a function f is defined to be the minimal communication cost among all protocols that solve the function f correctly. While communication complexity cares about the number of transmitted bits, the information complexity cares about the information revealed by the communicated bits. To be able to measure information, we need to assume a prior distribution μ on the input space X × Y. Once we assumed the input distribution μ, the transcript Π becomes a random variable: it denotes the random transcript of the protocol π that runs on a randomly sampled input (x, y) according to distribution μ. The information cost of a protocol π is, intuitively, how much information one can learn about the input X and Y by observing the random transcript Π . There are two different notions of information cost, depending on who are the observers.
Definition 1 (Information cost)
The external information cost and the internal information cost of a protocol π with respect to a distribution μ on X × Y are defined as IC
and
respectively, where Π = Π XY is the transcript of the protocol when it is executed on the input XY that is randomly sampled according to μ.
Intuitively, the external information cost, as the name suggests, specifies what an external observer can learn about the input XY by knowing the random transcript Π . In contrast, the internal information cost is the amount of information that Alice and Bob can learn about each other's input by looking at the random transcript.
Usually when we simply say information cost, we mean the internal information cost.
Definition 3 (Information complexity)
Given two distributions μ, ν on the input space X × Y. The external information complexity and the internal information complexity of a function f with respect to a distribution μ, are defined as the infimum information cost with respect to μ among all (randomized) protocols that perform the task
respectively. The distributional external information complexity and the distributional internal information complexity of a function f with respect to a distribution μ, are defined as the infimum information cost with respect to μ among all (randomized) protocols that perform the task [ f , ν, 0], i.e.,
respectively.
Our focus will be on the (non-distributional) IC μ ( f ) and IC ext μ ( f ), that is, the communication task that we shall focus on will be exclusively on [ f ] , that is, to compute the function f correctly for all inputs.
Remark 1 (Remarks on Definition 3)
(1) The infimum is essential in the definition. In other words, there are functions (e.g., the 2-bit AND function) for which there is no protocol that achieves IC μ ( f ) while there is a sequence of protocols whose information costs converge to IC μ ( f ). (2) In defining the distributional information complexity, the distribution μ is used to measure the information cost while the distribution ν is used to measure the error of a protocol. In practice, often ν is chosen to be the same as μ, hence the notations IC ext μ ( f , μ) and IC μ ( f , μ), respectively. (3) In the literature of information complexity it was common to use "IC μ ( f )" to denote its distributional counterpart, i.e., what we denote by IC μ ( f , μ). Unfortunately, this has become the source of some confusions in the past, as sometimes "IC μ ( f )" is used to denote both (non-distributional) IC μ ( f ) and the distributional information complexity IC μ ( f , μ).
As an example to show the difference between IC μ ( f ) and IC μ ( f , μ): let f = AND be the two-bit AND function, and μ be the uniform distribution on (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0). Obviously IC ext μ ( f , μ) = 0 since a protocol that simply outputs 0 without any communication solves the task [AND, μ] . On the other hand, IC ext μ ( f ) = log 3 by [2] .
Lastly, we also need the uniform continuity of the information complexity with respect to μ. 
The Multi-party Number-In-Hand Model
The number-in-hand model is the most straightforward generalization of Yao's twoparty model to the settings where more than two players are present. In this model there are k players who wish to collaboratively compute a function f :
Each player i knows only an input x i ∈ X i , and the communication is in the shared blackboard model, which means that all the communicated bits are visible to all the players. Let μ be a distribution on
, and the continuity also generalize in a straightforward manner to this setting.
The Local Characterization of the Optimal Information Cost
Fix a function f : X × Y → Z, the information complexity IC μ ( f ) (or IC ext μ ( f )) can be viewed as a function of μ, and it is continous (Lemma 1). Let π be a protocol that solves [ f , 0], by definition one has IC μ (π ) IC μ ( f ), i.e., the information cost of π is an upper bound of the information complexity. How to show a conjectured optimal protocol π is indeed optimal? This is equivalent to show that the information cost of π is also a lower bound for any other protocols. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that essentially one can show the optimality of a protocol by verifying a simple "local" condition.
In order to state the local condition, we define some notions related to a single random bit. Consider the two-party communication model. Let B be a random bit sent by one of the players in some protocol, and let μ 0 = μ| B=0 and μ 1 = μ| B=1 , or in other words
for b = 0, 1. In particular, supp
Note we use (x, y) and x y interchangeably for the sake of convenience depending on the context.
Definition 4
Let μ be a distribution and B be a bit sent by one of the players.
-B is called unbiased with respect to μ if Pr[
A protocol is said to be in normal form with respect to μ if all bits sent in it are unbiased and non-crossing with respect to μ. Obviously, the above notions can be generalized into the multi-party setting in a straightforward manner.
Remark 2 (A discussion on non-crossing bits)
The notion of non-crossing bits defined in Definition 4 is slightly different from the one defined in [2, Section 7.4] .
The notion of non-crossing bits in [2, Section 7.4] is specifically defined for AND 2 function. Let μ be a distribution on the input space for the 2-bit AND 2 function, that
10) and δ = μ (11) . Suppose Alice is the row player and Bob is the column player.
, that is, for a randomly sampled input according to μ, it is more likely that Bob has a 0 than Alice does. Intuitively, for μ satisfies β < γ , it is then better for Bob to speak first in the optimal protocol for AND 2 to reduce information leakage. Based on such intuition, in [2] , a distribution μ with β < γ is called in Bob's region, and β > γ in Alice's region, and a bit B is said to be non-crossing if μ| B=0 and μ| B=1 stay in the same region as μ. It is easy to see that any non-crossing bit in Definition 4 is non-crossing in the sense in [2] . We choose our definition to allow generality for functions other than AND.
Finally we point out that the above discussion shows an optimal protocol can depend on the input distribution: the players act differently in an optimal protocol if the input distribution changes. The non-crossing property simplifies the task of verifying the local condition, as we shall see shortly.
. These distributions are characterized in [7] .
The Local Characterization
Let us first understand the properties that IC μ ( f ) satisfies as a function of μ. Given the input distribution μ, consider a protocol where one player first sends a random bit B, and if B = 0, the players continue by running a protocol that is optimal for μ 0 , and if B = 1, they run a protocol that is optimal for μ 1 . Denote
That is, they are the information cost revealed by B to the external observer and internal players, respectively. By definition, the information cost of this protocol is an upper bound of the information complexity,
Similarly, for the external case,
Note that (11) is a local condition: it concerns only the bit B. If a protocol π is optimal, then IC μ (π ) should also satisfy (11) . In [2, Section 5.2] it is shown that this simple condition suffices for our purpose: it characterizes the optimal information cost as a function of μ ∈ Δ(X × Y).
, and (ii) for every signal B that can be sent by one of the players,
Furthermore, in both of the external and the internal cases, it suffices to verify (ii) only for non-crossing unbiased signals B.
In light of Theorem 1, in order to determine the values of IC μ ( f ), one has to first prove an upper bound by constructing a protocol (or a sequence of protocols) for every distribution μ. Then it suffices to verify that the information cost of this protocol, as a function of μ, satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. [2] : Let π be the buzzers protocol for AND 2 function, in [2] IC μ (π ) is computed to be an explicit formula for any given μ (hence also for μ 0 and μ 1 ), and thus the Condition (ii) in Theorem 1 becomes an explicit inequality that one should verify. However, in [2, Section 7.6, 7.8] Condition (ii) is only verified for non-crossing, unbiased, and ε-weak signals where ε depends on μ. This is not sufficient.
A small gap in verifying Condition (ii) in
For example, set C(μ) = K 0 for distributions μ such that IC μ ( f ) > 0, and otherwise set C(μ) = 0. Obviously Condition (13) holds if C(μ) = 0. On the other hand, if C(μ) = K , equivalently IC μ ( f ) > 0, then by continuity of IC μ ( f ) as a function of μ, if we choose the signal B to be ε-weak where ε is sufficiently small depending on μ, one also has IC μ 0 ( f ) > 0 and IC μ 1 ( f ) > 0, hence C(μ 0 ) = C(μ 1 ) = K , and thus (13) holds in this case as well. Obviously, taking K to be sufficiently large violates the desired conclusion that
The function C in the previous example is not continuous. It turns out that, essentially, adding the continuity condition suffices. The proof of the following Theorem 2 is presented in Sect. 3.3.
Theorem 2 Let w
(iii) C(μ) is uniformly continuous with respect to μ.
Similarly, if we replace Ω by a subset containing the external trivial distributions for function f , and replace
Firstly, how to apply Theorem 2? Recall we discussed in Remark 2 that a protocol can depend on the input distribution μ (such as the buzzers protocol). Suppose we have a protocol π μ (that depends on μ) that we suspect is optimal. Think of the information cost IC μ (π μ ) as a function of μ, and we apply Theorem 2 with C(μ) := IC μ (π μ ). The Condition (iii) is automatically true (since information cost is defined via entropy). Next one verifies Condition (i). For example, if we choose Ω to be the set of internal trivial distributions, i.e., distributions ν such that IC ν ( f ) = 0, one needs to verify IC ν (π ν ) = 0 for all such ν. The main work is to verify the concavity Condition (ii): given an input distribution μ and suppose a non-crossing, unbiased, and ε-weak signal B is sent which results two new distributions μ 0 := μ| B=0 and μ 1 := μ| B=1 , one needs to verify IC μ (π μ )
]. Indeed, [2] verified Condition (ii) in Theorem 2 for non-crossing, unbiased, and ε-weak signals.
Secondly, in the statement of Theorem 2, we explicitly allow the set Ω to be possibly larger than the set of trivial distributions. Consequently, the Condition (i) changes accordingly comparing to Condition (i) in Theorem 1. As we shall see in Sect. 4.5, this flexibility is useful when we verify the optimality of the multi-party protocol.
Thirdly, Theorem 2 is stated for functions C instead of information costs of communication protocols directly, this allows to verify the optimality of possibly unconventional protocols directly instead of discretizing it first.
Finally, as we shall see in Sect. 3.3, the proof of Theorem 2 does not depend on the two-party model, i.e., Theorem 2 can be straightforwardly generalized into the multi-party setting. In fact, Condition (i) and (iii) does not depend on whether the underlying model is two-party or multi-party. For Condition (ii), we remarked before that one can generalize the non-crossing, unbiased, and weak signal into multi-party setting, and obviously one can also generalize the definition of I B in (10) naturally into the multi-party setting. We do not state separately a counterpart of Theorem 2 in the multi-party setting, as the modification will be only notational.
Communication Protocols as Random Walks on 1(X × Y)
One can view a communication protocol as a random walk on Δ(X × Y) (see [2, 7] ), and this sometimes simplifies our view towards a protocol and its information cost. We will need to apply it in proof of Theorem 2.
Consider a protocol π and a prior distribution μ on X × Y. Suppose that firstly Alice sends a random signal B to Bob, we can interpret this as a random update of the prior distribution μ to a new distribution μ 0 := μ| B=0 or μ 1 := μ| B=1 depending on the value of B. Things are similar when Bob sends a signal. Therefore, we can think of a protocol as a random walk on Δ(X × Y) that starts at μ, and every time that a player sends a signal, it moves to a new distribution with a step of random walk in
Let Π denote the random transcript of the protocol π . The random walk corresponding to the protocol π starts at μ and terminates at μ Π := μ| Π . Since Π is a random variable, μ Π is also a random variable taking values in Δ(X × Y). Therefore, the distribution of μ Π is a distribution on Δ(X × Y). For example, let Π = t be a specific transcript (one can also think of t as a leaf of the protocol tree, as they are one-to-one correspondent), then μ t (x y) := Pr[XY = x y|Π = t] is the updated distribution (from the prior distribution μ) on the input space X × Y when an external observer sees the transcript t (alternatively, when the protocol reaches the leaf t). The notation μ Π is hence also called as "distribution on distributions" in [2, Section 7.2].
Recall
Note that the distribution of XY | Π=t is simply μ t . The above discussion shows the external information cost of the protocol π is completely determined by the prior distribution μ and the final distribution of μ Π . To avoid confusion, let us emphasize again that different from μ which lies in
Obviously, same argument also applies to the internal case via the similar identity I(X ; 
Proof of Theorem 2
A High-Level Discussion of the Proof Strategy
Note that to show C(μ)
for any protocol π that performs the task [ f , 0]. The local condition (14) naturally suggests an inductive proof of Theorem 2 by induction on the number of bits of the protocol.
An inductive pseudo-proof The base case: if a protocol performs
The induction hypothesis: suppose C(μ) IC μ (π ) for any protocol π that performs [ f , 0] and sends at most k bits.
Now let π be a protocol that performs [ f , 0] and sends k + 1 bits. Consider the first bit B in π , and assume B is non-crossing, unbiased, and weak (let us for now ignore the parameter of weakness), by Condition (ii) in Theorem 2,
Let π 0 and π 1 denote the sub-protocol of π that starts at B = 0 and B = 1, respectively. Then π 0 and π 1 satisfy the inductive hypothesis. Hence
These together imply C(μ) IC μ (π ), complete the proof. An immediate problem is: actually, what we proved is only for protocols in which all bits sent are non-crossing, unbiased, and weak. This is obviously insufficient. Hence we will first show a signal simulation lemma (Lemma 3) which says that any bit sent in a protocol can be simulated by a sequence of non-crossing, unbiased, and weak bits. This seems resolve the problem. However, a new issue is: this simulation might be infinite. In particular, if we use our signal simulation lemma to simulate a finite protocol, we might get a protocol that sends infinitely many bits. This hinders the induction. As we shall see, we will need to use the uniform continuity assumption of C(μ) and of IC μ ( f ) with respect to μ to resolve this issue, and complete the proof.
The Signal Simulation Lemma
We start by restating a splitting lemma from [2] . Let We emphasize that the simulation is done by the same player, which is obviously required in order to control the information leakage. Lemma 2 is proved in [2, Lemma 7.11], there is a minor mistake in the original statement as it is claimed that the lemma holds for ρ ∈ [ρ 0 , ρ 1 ] where the interval is closed.
We are now ready to prove the signal simulation lemma, which says any signal sent by one player can be perfectly simulated by the same player using a sequence of noncrossing, unbiased, and ε-weak signals. In terms of random walk, it shows that an onestep random walk can be simulated by a random walk consists of a sequence of possibly infinitely many smaller steps where each smaller step satisfies good properties. It generalizes [2, Lemma 5.2] .
Although the proof of Lemma 3 is long, it is not difficult: it simply verifies that one can force the signal in each simulation step to be non-crossing, unbiased and weak, by appropriately choosing how far the smaller step in the simulation should jump from the current to the next. ε, and 
It suffices to verify 0 (1 + λ)(1 − α) 1. The nonnegativity is trivial. For the upper bound, one has
as desired. Hence we have shown the existence of the signal B i in Step 3.
We proceed to verify the properties of B i . Obviously it is unbiased. It is also ε-weak. Indeed,
and the choice of λ in (3.1) guarantees that this is bounded by ε. B i is also non-crossing. Indeed, if μ c (x, y) < μ c (x , y ), by our choice of λ, we have y ) . Expanding the absolute value in (20) with a negative sign gives the other inequality.
Obviously the above analysis can be carried over the signal B i in Step 4 analogously. Next to show the sequence B terminates with probability 1. Define
Note that Ω is a finite set. Indeed, we first observe that if ν = μ 0 , μ 1 , then "or" in the definition can be replaced by "and", this is because ν is a convex combination of μ 0 and μ 1 , and if
This linear equation uniquely determines α for the given (x, y) and (x , y ), if any. This shows every pair (x, y) = (x , y ) corresponds to at most one ν, hence Ω is finite. Consider
Step 3, i.e., μ c ∈ [μ 0 , μ]. If the value of λ is set by (3.1), then there is a uniform lower-bound for λ:
Indeed, since μ c ∈ [μ 0 , μ], that is, μ c is closer to μ 0 than μ, it can be easily verified that max xy
(here we also use the fact that supp μ c = supp μ, see (9)).
If λ is set by (3.2), i.e., there exist (x, y) = (x , y ) such that μ c (x, y) < μ c (x , y ) and the equality in (3.2) holds for our choice of λ (since we choose the largest λ), equivalently, either
One can analyze Step 4 analogously. Suppose the uniform lower bound corresponding to (23) that comes from Step 4 is λ 0 . Let λ := min{λ 0 , λ 0 ,
Hence starting at any point μ c , the random walk terminates with probability at least 2 −( 1/λ +|Ω|) after 1/λ + |Ω| steps. It follows that with probability 1, the random walk terminates.
Finally, since the sequence B is generated by an unbiased random walk in the interval [μ 0 , μ 1 ] that starts from μ and eventually either reaches μ 0 or μ 1 , the distributions of μ| B and μ| B are the same.
Proof of Theorem 2
As we sketched in Sect. 3.3.1, the highlevel proof structure is a simulation (of an arbitrary protocol) followed by an induction. We first write the induction step as a technical lemma as follows.
Lemma 4 Let w, δ(μ) and C be as in Theorem 2, and suppose C satisfies Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii)
. Let τ be a protocol that terminates with probability 1, and further assume τ is in normal form and every signal sent in τ is ε-weak. Given a distribution μ ∈ Δ(X × Y), for every node u in the protocol tree of τ , let μ u be the distribution conditioned on the event that the protocol reaches u. If μ satisfies w(δ(μ u )) ε for every internal node u, then
where the expected value is over all leaves of τ chosen according to the distribution (on the leaves) when the inputs are sampled according to μ.
Proof For every internal node u, the assumption in the statement of the lemma implies that the signal sent from u is w(δ(μ u ))-weak. Hence Condition (ii) of Theorem 2 shows the claim is true if τ is a 1-bit protocol, and thus by a simple induction as we did in Sect. 3 
.3.1, it is true if τ is a c-bit protocol for any c < ∞.
Now assume τ has infinite depth. Consider a large integer c, obtain τ c by truncating τ after c bits of communication, trivially IC μ (τ c ) IC μ (τ ). Let G c denote the set of the leaves of τ c in which the protocol is forced to terminate. Let L c be the set of leaves in τ with depth at most c. Clearly, the set of leaves in τ c is exactly G c ∪ L c . As τ c has a bounded depth, we have
Let Π c denote the transcript of τ c . As τ terminates with probability 1, given any α > 0, one can guarantee Pr[Π c (x y) ∈ G c ] < α for every x y by choosing c to be sufficiently large. Hence
where L is the set of all leaves of τ .
Proof of Theorem 2 Firstly by (i), δ(μ)
Hence assume δ(μ) > 0. Let π be an arbitrary protocol that performs [ f , 0], our aim is to show C(μ) IC μ (π ).
For any η such that 0 < η < δ(μ), applying Lemma 3 one can get a new protocol π by replacing every signal sent in π with a random walk consisting of w(η)-weak, non-crossing and unbiased signals, andπ terminates with probability 1. Moreover, sinceπ is a perfect simulation of π , by Proposition 1 we have IC μ (π ) = IC μ (π).
For every node v in the protocol tree ofπ , let μ v be the distribution μ conditioned on the event that the protocol reaches the node v. Obtain τ fromπ by terminating at every node v that satisfies δ(μ v ) η. Note that by the construction, Condition (ii) is satisfied on every internal node v of τ , as every such node satisfies δ (μ v 
) > η, thus w(δ(μ v )) w(η) implying the signal sent on node v is w(δ(μ v ))-weak. Hence by Lemma 4,
where the expected value is over all leaves of τ . For every μ , let μ ∈ Ω be a distribution such that δ(μ ) = |μ − μ |. By Conditions (i) and (iii), and the uniform continuity of IC μ ( f ), for every ε > 0 there exists η > 0, such that for all μ , as long as
As a result, C(μ)
As this holds for arbitrary ε, we must have
The Multi-party AND Function in the Number-In-Hand Model
In [2] it is shown that in the two-player setting, a certain (unconventional) protocol that we refer to as the buzzers protocol, has optimal information and external information cost for the two-party AND 2 function. In this section we show that the buzzers protocol can be generalized to an optimal protocol for the multi-party AND k function in the number-in-hand model (assuming Assumption 1): the support of μ is a subset of {0, 1, e 1 , . . . , e k }.
The Generalized Buzzers Protocol
For the sake of brevity, we denote μ x := μ({x}) for every x ∈ {0, 1} k . Furthermore without loss of generality we assume that μ e 1 · · · μ e k . The protocol is given by having buzzers with waiting times which have independent exponential distributions, and start at times t 1 , . . . , t k for players 1, . . . , k, respectively. Although the protocol π ∧ μ described in Fig. 1 is not a conventional communication protocol, it can be easily approximated by discretization and truncation of time.
For every i ∈ [k], if x i = 0 then the ith player activates a buzzer at time t i (later we call it the "activation time") and becomes "active". The protocol terminates with k i=1 x i = 0 once the first buzz happens, otherwise the time reaches ∞ without anyone buzzing, and they decide k i=1 x i = 1. Obviously, the protocol π ∧ μ performs the task [AND k , 0], i.e., it computes AND k (x) correctly for all x ∈ {0, 1} k .
Theorem 3
For every μ satisfying Assumption 1, the protocol π ∧ μ has the smallest external and internal information cost. Note that since μ is supported on {0, 1, e 1 , . . . , e k }, it can be parametrized using k + 2 variables. However, the fact that k is itself also a variable makes it impossible to directly compute the information cost IC μ (π ∧ μ ) as what is done in [2] for the twoparty case. We will show, through a series of reductions, that we only need to verify Condition (ii) in a small time interval that depends on the distribution μ and the weakness parameter ε of the signal, instead of the whole range, and furthermore, the distribution μ can in fact be parametrized by essentially 3 variables, enabling us to verify the concavity Condition (ii) in Theorem 2. See more discussion of the intuition of the reduction in Remark 3.
Notations and Set-Up
Let μ be a distribution satisfying Assumption 1, and X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) ∈ {0, 1} k be the random k-bit input. Let Π be the random transcript of protocol π ∧ μ , and Π x = Π | X =x .
As we remarked after Theorem 2, the main work is to verify Condition (ii). Given the input distribution to be μ, denote
Consider a signal B sent by one player s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} satisfying,
It is easy to verify that B is unbiased and ε-weak. Let μ 0 and μ 1 denote the distributions of X 0 := X | B=0 and X 1 := X | B=1 , then μ = μ 0 +μ 1 2 . Let Π 0 and Π 1 denote the random variables corresponding to the transcripts of π ∧ μ 0 and π ∧ μ 1 , respectively. Then Condition (ii) is,
for the internal case, and
for the external case.
The distributions μ 0 and μ 1 For B = 0, if x s = 0, then
Similarly one can compute the case when x s = 1. Hence we have,
By the fact μ = μ 0 +μ 1 2 , one gets,
It is then easy to see that the signal B sent by player s is non-crossing if ε is sufficiently small. Recall we assumed μ e 1 · · · μ e k , the non-crossing property ensures that this order is also respected by μ 0 and μ 1 .
The distributions of Π , Π 0 and Π 1 , and the intuition of reduction For convenience, we collect the terms and notations that we use frequently regarding the protocol π ∧ μ :
-activation time: denoted by t i := ln
, player i becomes active at t i if his/her input is 0; -active: player i is active if he/she receives a 0 and the current time t t i ; -active duration: the time duration that the player has been active before time t; -total active duration: the sum of active duration of all (active) players before time t, denoted by Φ x (t); -termination time: the time when the protocol terminates; -s: the player who sends the signal B; -m: a generic player.
Note the random transcript Π contains the termination time t, and if t < ∞, also the name of the player who buzzed. We denote by π ∞ the transcript corresponding to termination time t = ∞, and by π m t the termination time t < ∞ with player m buzzing.
Suppose player i receives a bit 0. For t ∈ [0, ∞), the time duration that player i has been active is max{t − t i , 0}. Let Φ x (t) denote the total active duration spent by all players before time t if the input is x. For t r t < t r +1 , we have
Note that player m can buzze at time t < ∞, only if x m = 0, t t m , and no player has buzzed before time t. Let f x denote the probability density function of the random variable Π x , then
otherwise.
Also Pr(Π 1 = π ∞ ) = 1. Let f denote the probability density function of the random transcript
Denote f 0 x , f 0 and f 1 x , f 1 analogously for Π 0 and Π 1 . Consider π ∧ μ 0 that runs on input distribution μ 0 . Since the input distribution μ 0 is different from μ, the starting times in π ∧ μ 0 for players change accordingly. We call the starting time in π ∧ μ 0 for player i as new starting time, and denote it by t 0 i := ln 
Hence
Similarly, the new starting times in π ∧ μ 1 are t 1 i = t i for i = s, and t 1 s = t s + γ 1 where
Hence when m = s,
and for m = s, 
Use the fact
is the PDF function), and φ(x) = x ln(x), we have
Combining (40)-(42), the Condition (ii) for external information cost given in (29) is equivalent to,
in which
A similar calculation shows for the internal case, the condition (28) is equivalent to,
where
, and f 0 x j =b (π m t ) and f 1 x j =b (π m t ) are similarly defined.
Reductions
Our goal is to verify (43) and (45), which are integrations over the time range from −∞ to ∞. Using the memoryless property of exponential distribution, one can shift the activation time of all the players by − ln(μ e s /μ e 1 ), and assume that t 1 = − ln(μ e s /μ e 1 ), . . . , t s = 0, . . . , t k = ln(μ e k /μ e s ). It turns out that the integration in (43) and (45) on the ranges (−∞, −γ 0 ] and [γ 1 , ∞] are both nonnegative, hence it suffices to focus on the small time interval [−γ 0 , γ 1 ] which depends on the distribution μ and the (weakness) parameter ε. Furthermore, this fact also enables us to parametrize the distribution μ using essentially 3 parameters. This makes it possible to verify Condition (ii) of Theorem 2 using the software Wolfram Mathematica.
Firstly we analyze the information cost of the distribution μ that is uniform on {e 1 , . . . , e k }, i.e., μ e 1 = · · · = μ e k = 1/k. For the purpose of reducing the number of variables to parametrize the distribution μ from arbitrary to 3, this step is not necessary. However, it turns out that to verify Condition (ii) it is necessary to analyze this distribution separately. Later we will choose Ω (see this notation in Theorem 2) to include this μ together with trivial distributions.
Statement 1
Let μ be the distribution μ e 1 = · · · = μ e k = 1/k. The internal and external information cost of the protocol π ∧ is optimal with respect to μ.
Observe that all the information will be revealed if the input is 1, that is, every player receives a 1. This special case can be removed from the analysis.
Statement 2
To verify (43) and (45), it suffices to assume μ satisfies μ(1) = 0.
Our third major reduction shows that
Similarly for the internal case. This shows, as we mentioned before, that we can focus on a small time interval [−γ 0 , γ 1 ].
Statement 3 Assuming μ(1) = 0, it suffices to verify
Lastly we parametrize the distribution μ with essentially 3 parameters (i.e., s, β and γ 0 ). Firstly we observe that conditioned on the buzz time t ∈ [−γ 0 , γ 1 ], we have μ e 1 | t t s −γ 0 = · · · = μ e s−1 | t t s −γ 0 . Secondly, we show that one can transfer the mass on those e j where μ e j > μ e s to μ 0 . . , e k , we would get a contradiction with the assumption that π solves AND k correctly on all inputs. Hence to every transcript τ , we can assign a j(τ ) ∈ {1, . . . , m} with Pr[ Π e j = τ ] = 0. Now for a random X ∼ μ, denote J = j( Π X ), and notice that conditioned on J = j, X is supported on the set {e 1 , . . . , e k } \ {e j } of size k − 1, and thus H(X |J ) log(k − 1). Consequently, we have
Statement 4 To verify
On the other hand, consider our protocol π ∧ μ and let Π denote its random transcript. Note that under μ, all players are activated at the same time, and consequently by symmetry, for every termination time t and player j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the random variable X | Π X =(t, j) is uniformly distributed on {e 1 , . . . , e k }\{e j }. Hence H(X |Π X ) = log(k − 1). We conclude that
Next we turn to the internal case. Again, let π be any protocol that solves the multi-party AND k correctly, and let J be defined as above. First note that for i ∈ [k], X | X i =1 is supported on the single point {e i } (hence H(X |X i = 1) = 0) and X | X i =0 is uniformly distributed on {e 1 , . . . , e k } \ {e i }. Hence
.
Summing over i, we obtain
and thus
On the other hand, for the protocol π ∧ μ , by symmetry, for every termination time t and player j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the random variable X | Π X =(t, j),X i =0 is uniformly distributed on {e 1 , . . . , e k } \ {e j , e i }. Hence
We conclude that (43) and (45), it suffices to assume μ satisfies μ(1) = 0.
Statement 2 To verify
Proof We will show if π ∧ is optimal for distributions that have zero mass on 1, then π ∧ is also optimal for general distributions that can have non-zero mass on 1. This will prove the statement. Let μ be an arbitrary distribution, and let π be a protocol that solves the multi-party AND k function correctly on all inputs. Let Π denote the transcript of this protocol, and let R X = 1 [X =1] . Since π solves the AND k correctly, Π determines the value of R X , that is H(R X |Π X ) = 0. Hence
where μ is the distribution μ conditioned on the event that the input is not equal to 1, and H(μ 1 ) denotes the binary entropy with the parameter μ 1 . Suppose we have shown that π ∧ is optimal for all distributions ν that satisfies
for any protocol π . Then, by the equality we just established, one has
That is, π ∧ will be optimal for distributions that can have non-zero mass on input 1.
The argument for internal case is similar.
Statement 3 Assuming μ(1) = 0, it suffices to verify
Proof Recall that it is player s who sends a signal B, and we have shifted the activation time of every player so that t s = 0 (see the discussion at the beginning of Sect. 4.3).
Recall also −γ 0 is the time that player s can become active in the protocol π ∧ μ 0 , and γ 1 is the time that player s can become active in the protocol π ∧ μ 1 . Throughout the proof, we confine ourselves in the time interval t ∈ [−γ 0 , γ 1 ].
Firstly we observe that conditioned on the buzz time t ∈ [−γ 0 , γ 1 ], we have μ e 1 | t t s −γ 0 = · · · = μ e s−1 | t t s −γ 0 . Hence we can assume μ e 1 = · · · = μ e s−1 .
Secondly, we will show that we can also assume μ e j = μ e s for all j s. Suppose μ satisfies μ e s = · · · = μ e s+a < μ e s+a+1 for some a 0 with s+a+1 k. Let μ be a distribution on {0, 1} s+a defined as: μ 0 = μ 0 + j>s+a μ e j , and μ e j = μ e j for 1 j s + a. Note that we have used the notation e j to denote the jth basis vector, and 0 to denote the all-0 vector in both {0, 1} s+a and {0, 1} k . Note that μ is a distribution satisfying Assumption 1 where the number of players is s + a, and furthermore μ e j = μ e s for all s j s + a. Hence we can consider to verify the Condition (ii) for the protocol π ∧ μ that solves AND s+a correctly. We will show,
(2) By definition of the distributions μ, μ , one has
Hence it suffices to show k j=s+a+1
In Sect. 4.5 we show the external concavity condition indeed holds, hence (53) implies 
Proof of Theorem 3
Information Cost of Multi-party AND Function
To simplify the notation, since every function has the argument π m t , we sometimes omit it, such as we write f to mean f (π m t ). We will use μ 0 , μ j , f 0 , f j instead of μ 0 , μ e j , f 0 , f e j when there is no ambiguity, similar notations are used for distributions μ 0 , μ 1 and functions f 0 , f 1 .
Taylor Expansions
Recall β s = μ s and ζ s = 1 − β s . By the reductions in Sect. 4.3, we can assume that
(54) Observe that 0 < β < 1/k (the distribution when β = 0 is both external and internal trivial). Furthermore, viewing γ 0 and γ 1 as functions of ε, plugging β s = e γ 0 β and ζ s = 1 − β s = 1 − e γ 0 β into (35) and (37), by implicit differentiation, we have
As γ 0 + γ 1 4ε, by (56), the constant in O(ε 4 ) in (58) can be bounded by
-Taylor expansion of internal concavity condition (45).
A direct calculation gives,
As did for the external case, when f (π m t ) = 0 the above formula expands as follows,
Lemma 5 implies the first and third terms in (60) become 0 in (45). Let 
Density Functions in Explicit Form
We continue to calculate functions explicitly that will be used for computing. By Theorem 2, we have proved the protocol π ∧ in Fig. 1 is optimal for external information cost.
Internal Information Cost
Similarly, using Wolfram Mathematica, we obtain 
Similarly one can pick an appropriate function w to verify that the concavity condition (45) is satisfied for all w(δ(μ))-weak signals when ε is sufficiently small. Hence by Theorem 2, the protocol is optimal for internal information cost.
Discussion
A natural extension of our result is to remove the Assumption 1. This seems difficult without new ideas, as even under Assumption 1 we need to study the protocol in great detail and rely on heavy computation. Secondly, is it possible to compute explicitly IC μ (π ∧ μ ) and IC ext μ (π ∧ μ ) as functions that depend on the parametrization of the distribution μ? We have not attempted to do so. Recall we discussed our Assumption 1 on the distribution has a background in communication complexity of the k-party promised set disjointness problem PDISJ n,k , and the order of which were determined to be Ω(n/k) in [5, 9] . The method in [5, 9] is to compute a lower bound of a variant of information complexity of AND k introduced in [1] . Since we showed the protocol π ∧ is optimal for AND k , it would be interesting to see if the optimal information cost IC μ (π ∧ μ ) would give us any knowledge about the constant in Ω(n/k). We defer this to a future work.
We have focused exclusively on the multi-party number-in-hand model. Another natural multi-party communication model is the number-on-forehead (NoF) model. Attempt to define information complexity in NoF model has been considered in some restricted sense in [8] , where the communication is restricted to be one way, and furthermore player i can only, roughly, uses information about inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i−1 . To the knowledge of the authors, no substantial study has been made on multi-party information complexity in the NoF model, even for AND k function. In general, extend and determine the exact information complexity in the NoF model is an interesting open problem.
Finally, we mention that inspired by the local concavity characterization (i.e., Theorem 1) of the optimal information cost given in [2] , in [13] a set of partial differential equations (PDE) is given to characterize the optimal information cost for AND 2 and for general functions in the two-party setting. The solution of the PDE system in [13] gives the optimal information cost of the two-bit AND 2 function. It would be interesting to see how the PDE characterization would work in the multi-party setting, and in particular, whether it can simplify our argument, or even extract an explicit formula for information cost for AND k . 
